Pre-event research · Justin Kim

Singapore and Thailand Between the United States and China: Security Ties, Economic Stakes

How do two countries preserve room for manoeuvre through different security and economic relationships?

Sources checked: 25 October 2026

Southeast Asian states are often described as trying not to choose between the United States and China. That description identifies a preference, but it does not explain how different countries pursue it. Singapore and Thailand offer a useful comparison: both maintain substantial relationships with the two powers, yet their security arrangements and economic connections cannot be understood through a single formula.

This preliminary briefing asks how the two countries preserve room for manoeuvre when security cooperation and economic relationships intersect. It draws on public official documents rather than interviews. Its interpretations are provisional, and its questions are intended to guide further reading and conversations before the 41st ASEAN Roundtable.

Security: different relationships, overlapping partners

Singapore's defence ministry explicitly distinguishes extensive cooperation with Washington from treaty-alliance status. In its March 2025 parliamentary speech, the ministry described longstanding military training in the United States and purchases of American platforms, while also discussing military engagement with China. The distinction matters: close defence cooperation should not automatically be treated as a commitment to support every American policy. Singapore Ministry of Defence

Thailand's relationship has a different institutional starting point. The United States identifies Thailand as an ally, and the two countries co-hosted Cobra Gold in 2026. The exercise included military training and humanitarian activities. These are observable forms of cooperation; they do not, on their own, establish how Bangkok would respond to a particular future confrontation. U.S. Army

Thailand also maintains security cooperation with China. Their February 2025 joint statement set out intentions covering military exchanges, exercises, training, and defence-industrial cooperation. Reading this alongside Cobra Gold complicates any assumption that alliance status excludes other security relationships. However, a joint statement records announced commitments, not proof that every proposed activity has been implemented. Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The useful comparison is therefore not which country is closer to Washington in the abstract. It is which relationships provide capabilities, access, reassurance, or flexibility, and what constraints accompany them. Alliance labels, exercise participation, and procurement decisions should be examined separately before being combined into an assessment of national strategy.

Economics: Washington is not only a security partner

A second shortcut presents America as the security partner and China as the economic partner. The trade evidence makes that division difficult to sustain. USTR estimates that U.S. goods trade with Singapore reached US$79.9 billion in 2025, while goods trade with Thailand reached US$110.8 billion. On the same U.S.-reported basis, Washington recorded a goods surplus of US$3.4 billion with Singapore and a deficit of US$71.7 billion with Thailand. USTR: Singapore, USTR: Thailand

These figures use one year, one reporting country, and one trade category. They show that economic exposure to the United States is important in both cases, but do not measure dependence by themselves. Total trade should not be confused with domestic value added, investment, services, or the share of an economy exposed to a particular market. Nor does a bilateral deficit demonstrate political alignment.

Singapore's foreign ministry offered a broader description in September 2025: it identified the United States as its leading services-trade partner and largest foreign investor, while describing China as its leading goods-trade partner. Those were the ministry's characterisations at that time, not independently updated rankings for this briefing. Their significance is the range of relationships involved, rather than an enduring league table. Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Thailand-China statement likewise places economic and security cooperation within the same bilateral relationship. This suggests a research approach that follows particular sectors and decisions rather than assigning each major power an exclusive role. A fuller comparison would need matching evidence on investment, supply chains, and sector-specific exposure. The present briefing does not establish which country is more economically dependent on China.

Room for manoeuvre is a question, not a conclusion

Singapore's official discussion of international change emphasises the vulnerability of an open economy to protectionism and fragmented supply chains. Its March 2025 foreign-policy speech linked economic disruption to broader changes in the international order. This is evidence of the government's stated assessment; evaluating the effectiveness of its response requires additional evidence. Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs

One working interpretation is that Singapore and Thailand face overlapping pressures through different institutional relationships and economic channels. Maintaining ties with both powers may preserve options, but describing that as successful flexibility requires evidence about outcomes. Domestic decision-making, policy continuity, and the costs of particular choices also deserve investigation. This limited comparison does not isolate those factors or establish a complete explanation for either country's conduct.

Questions to take into the roundtable

Three questions follow. When does security cooperation become a constraint on diplomatic choice, rather than a source of options? Which forms of economic exposure are most relevant to policymakers: export markets, investment, technology, or supply-chain inputs? And where can ASEAN cooperation reduce pressures that individual states struggle to manage alone?

For subsequent conversations, a concrete policy example would be more useful than a broad declaration that countries avoid choosing sides. Asking a researcher to identify one decision, explain the available alternatives, and recommend supporting materials could help test this briefing's assumptions. The aim is to make the next question more precise, while leaving room for evidence that challenges the initial comparison.